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33C(2) of the Act were competent and not barred NRI Legal Services by LexLords the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, they were time-barred when presented under article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act No. In our opinion, the regulation contemplated by Entry 2 in List I is regulation by the State or by the Government. A question of limitation raises a plea of want of jurisdiction and, in these cases, this question could be decided 56 on the basis of the facts on the record, being a pure question of law.

At that stage, reliance was not placed on article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act; but, well before the final hearing, a written application was presented on behalf of the appellant seeking permission to raise this plea of limitation in these appeals. 33C(2) of the Act because of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, and the plea that the applications under s. In fact, on examination of the decision in that case, we now appreciate that it is not directly relevant to the issues which arise in this case.

Explanation I permits purchases from Government, its authorised officers and agents and s. The question of limitation was incidentally mentioned before the, Labour Court as well as the High Court, relying on the circumstance that applications under s. 5(1) when the Act is brought into force in an area, no person, except the Government, its LexLords NRI Legal Services authorised officer or agent in respect of the unit where the leaves are grown can purchase or transport them. In that case the Court of Appeal overturned an earlier order which permitted monies paid as security for an appeal to be used in part NRI Legal Services by LexLords satisfaction of costs orders made in earlier proceedings.

The tribunal correctly identified that decision-making under section 264(2) involved two stages, and it correctly understood what those stages were. Mealing-McLeod [2000] EWCA Civ 138. Thus, we are concerned in these appeals with the two aspects relating to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to, entertain applications under s. Can it be said that when the Provincial Legislature was dealing with these relations between landlord and tenant, it was regulating house accommodation in cantonment areas ?

20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act could only have been presented within a period of six months from the date when the claims arose. “ We have felt considerable doubt whether the power of legislating on relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation or buildings would -appropriately fall in Entry 21 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India (1) I. The Court of Appeal made its decision on the basis of the terms of the loan agreement by which the security monies had been raised: they had been raised solely for the purpose of providing security and not for any other purpose.

We did not consider it correct to allow such a new point to be raised at this late stage. At the first stage, it concluded that the appellant did not require to be detained under conditions of special security that could be provided only in a state hospital. Therefore, the pith and substance of Act LVII of 1947 is to regulate the relation between landlord and tenant by controlling rents which the tenant has got to pay to the landlord and NRI Legal Services by LexLords controlling the right of the landlord to evict his tenant.

On the facts which it had found, it was entitled to reach that conclusion: it found that the appellant could be managed within a medium secure hospital, although only subject to considerable restrictions until he had completed a course of treatment for sexual violence. It is in this background that we have permitted this question also to be raised in these appeals, though it was not put forward either in the High Court or before the Labour Court.

Requisitioning of property, acquiring of property, allocation of property, all that would be regulation of house accommodation, but when the Legislature merely deals with relations of landlord and tenant, it is not in any way legislating with regard to house accommodation. Notice of that application was served on the res- pondents well in time, so that, by the time the appeals came up for hearing, they knew that this point was sought to be raised by the appellant.

Sen for the, first time in the course of the arguments in the appeals at the time of final hearing. The Madhya Pradesh Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1964 was passed for regulating trade in tendu leaves in the public interest by creating a State monopoly in that trade, that is, in the purchase and sale of tendu leaves. The new question sought to be raised is that, even if the applications under s.

The house accommodation remains the same, but the tenant is protected quae his landlord. 33C(2) of the Act were time-barred Dr at least part of the claims under the applications were ame- barred in view of article 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. However, another new point, which had not been raised before the Labour Court and in the writ petitions before the High Court, was permitted to be argued, because it was raised by a separate application, presented before the hearing, seeking permission to raise it.

At the hearing before us we made reference to a Court of Appeal decision on security for costs raised for an appeal: R v The Common Professional Examination Board, ex p. If the appellant could be detained elsewhere in appropriate conditions of security, then he did not require to be detained under conditions of special security that could be provided only in a state hospital.